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THE EVOLUTION OF BUYOUT PRICING AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 
Afl  STRACT 
This paper presents evidence on systematic changes in the 
pricing and financial structure of 124  large  nanagernent  buyouts 
completed between 1980 and 1989.  We find that over tine (1) 
prices increased relative to current cash flows with no 
accompanying decrease in risk or increase in projected  future 
cash flows; (2) required bank principal repayments accelerated, 
leading to sharply lower ratios of cash flow to total debt 
obligations;  (3)  private subordinated debt was replaced by public 
debt while the use of strip-financing techniques declined;  and 
(4)  management teams invested a smaller fraction of their net 
worth in post-buyout equity.  These patterns of buyout prices and 
structures suggest that based on cx ante data,  one could have 
expected lower returns and more  frequent financial distress in 
later buyouts.  Preliminary  post-buyout evidence is consistent 
with this interpretation. 
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The value of leveraged  buyouts (LBOs) grew dramatically  in the 1980s, from just 
under $1 billion  in 1980 to over $60 billion in 1988.  More recently however, leverage has 
fallen out of favor.  The value of going private transactions dropped below $20 billion in 
1989 and declined  even further in 1990.1  The enormous run-up and subsequent sharp 
decline  has been  interpreted by many observers  as a sign that the dealmaking  pace of the late 
1980s was fundamentally  unsustainable,  i.e., that the increase in volume came at the expense 
of a deterioration in transaction quality.  Both academic research and press accounts have 
suggested that the LBOs of the early and mid-1980s  generated  high returns for debt and 
equity investors,  and rarely failed to make debt payments.2  In contrast, the LBOs of the 
later 1980s have drawn widespread criticism as having been unsoundly  financed.3  And, as 
we show below, a larger fraction of the later transactions have been  unable to meet their 
debt service requirements. 
In this paper, we examine detailed  evidence  from a sample of 124 large buyouts 
completed between  1980 and 1989.  Our goal is to determine  whether there were important 
systematic  ex-ante differences  between the deals done in the latter part of the decade and 
those done earlier. Itt other words, were there cx ante reasons to believe  that the later deals 
were more likely to run into difficulties, or must any such difficulties be attributed to 
unforcseeable  ex-post "bad luck" or poor performance? 
We consider three potential sources  of problems for buyout investors.  The first is 
the overall price paid to take the company  private.  Regardless of the details  of the capital 
1  See WI. Grimms Mergerstat Review.  The figures in this paragraph refer  to buyouts of 
public  companies  only. 
2 See Kaplan  (1989b),  Smith (1990a). Smith (1990b), and the roundtable  discussion (1990). 
Sec Smith (1990b);  mie takeover game isn't dead, it's just gone private," Forb, October 
1, 1990, p.64; "Many firms find debt they piled on in 1980s is a cruel taskmaster,"  Wall Street 
Journal, October 9, 1990, pal; "Hard lessons  from the debt decade," Fortune, June 18, 1990, 
p.76;  Leveraged  huyouts  fall to earth,"  Business Week, February 12, 1990, p.62. 2 
structure, or the extent to which there are costs of financial  distress,  it is clear that investors 
will earn lower returns as the prices paid increase relative to the fundamental  value of 
company assets. 
A second potential source  of  problems is a capital structure that is poorly designed  in 
terms of containing  costs of financial distress.  Even if the price paid to take a company 
private is a "reasonable' multiple  of  cash flow, a high probability  of costly distress will 
obviously lower the prospective  returns to some classes of investors.  In evaluating this 
possibility, it is important to go beyond such aggregate measures of  leverage as total debt to 
capital and interest coverage.  While these measures  can provide useful information  about 
the likelihood  that a company  will be unable to meet its contractual obligations,  they have 
much less to say about the attendant costs.  in principle, very low coverage need not impose 
large costs as long as the debt is structured in a  way that makes renegotiation frictionless. 
(See Jensen (1989)). Thus it is critical to focus not just on the absolute magnitude of the 
debt burden, but also on its contractual features -- seniority, maturity, and the division 
between private and public lenders. As emphasized  in recent theoretical papers by Gertner 
and Scharfstein  (1990) and Diamond (1991) the complex interaction between these features 
can play a key role in determining  costs of  financial distress. 
The third and final source of potential problems concerns the incentives of buyout 
investors.  One of the supposed spurs to improved performance in buyouts is the increased 
equity stake of management.  Managers who invest a large portion of their wealth in and own 
a large percentage of post-buyout equity might be expected  to manage better.  Conversely, 
managers who "cash out" a large fraction of their pre-buyout equity investment at the time of 
the buyout may have more of an incentive to take part in overpriced or poorly structured 
deals.  We examine whether these and other incentives changed over time. 
Our results are consistent  with each of the three "problems" worsening  over time.  We 
find that in the late 1980s:  (1) prices increased  relative  to current cash  flows with no 3 
accompanying  decrease in risk or increase in projected future cash flows; (2) required bank 
principal repayments accelerated,  leading to sharply  lower ratios of  cash flow to total debt 
obligations;  (3) private subordinated debt and bank debt were replaced by public 
subordinated debt while the use of strip-financing  techniques declined; and (4) management 
teams invested a smaller fraction of their net worth in post-buyout  equity. 
We also present preliminaiy  evidence on cx post  buyout performance. This evidence 
confirms that buyouts have been increasingly  unable to meet debt payments  over time.  Our 
evidence also fails to find strong differences  in ex post operating performance between 
earlier and later buyouts  suggesting that cx ante pricing and structuring have indeed played 
an important role in buyout success. 
One interpretation of our results  is that the initial success of early buyouts generated 
increased competition for later transactions  with the resulting higher prices  and more poorly 
structured deals.  Our results strongly  suggest that, in aggregate,  investors should reasonably 
have expected  lower returns in later deals.4  This raises the question of  which classes of 
investors  bore the brunt of the changes in expected  returns. It appears that banks reacted to 
the higher pnces by reducing the fraction of  total debt they provided  accelerating  required 
principal repayments,  and raising  their fees substantially.  In light of this behavior  by banks, 
the increased involvement of public subordinated lenders in these transactions is puzzling, 
and would seem to represent either a degree of miscalculation  or incentive problems at the 
institutions making  the loans. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2  describes our sample and data.  Section 
3 examines  the pricing question by looking at the relationship  between  buyout valuations  and 
It  is  harder  to  gauge  whether later deals were "overpriced"  or earlier deals were 
"underpriced"  in any absolute sense. 4 
such fundamentals  as cash  flow, risk, and growth expectations.  Section 4 takes a first cut at 
the capital structures of our sample companies,  presenting  aggregate data  on debt ratios and 
coverages.  The next three  sections focus more closely on individual components of the 
capital structure: Section 5 on senior bank debt; Section 6 on subordinated debt; and 
Section 7 on the composition  of equity  ownership and the associated management  incentives. 
Section 8 presents our  results on ex post  performance.  Finally, Section 9 summarizes  and 
integrates the findings. 
1  esgtion 
2.1  Buvout Companies 
Our sample  of buyouts is taken from companies  listed  as leveraged  buyouts or as 
acquisitions  by private companies in Securities Data  Corporation's merger database, in 
Morgan Stanley's merger database, and in W.T. Grimm's Mergerstat Review from 1980 to 
1989.  We restrict this sample to management  buyouts  (MBOs)  in which at least one 
member of the incumbent  management team obtains  an equity interest in the new private 
firm.  We focus on MBOs because ex  ante  data for these transactions  are generally more 
readily available and more complete.  The final sample satisfies the following criteria: 
1.  The Wall Street Journal (WSJ contains  an announcement that the company 
proposes to go private and the transaction is completed  by the end of 1989. 
2.  The newly private firm is an independent  entity, not a subsidiary  of another private 
company. 
3.  The proxy statement, 14D statement or WSJ  confirms that at least one member of 
the incumbent management  team obtains an equity interest in the new private firm. 5 
4.  The total transaction  value exceeds $100 million.5 
5.  Because  loans involving leveraged  ESOPs receive  an interest rate subsidy, we 
exclude LBOs that receive the majority of their financing through a leveraged  ESOP. 
We obtained 124 buyouts completed between 1980 and 1989 that satisfy these 
criteria.6  The total value of these 124 transactions exceeds $132 billion.  Over the same 
period, W.T. Grimm's Mergerstat Review identifies  $170.0 billion in going private 
transactions. Our sample, therefore, represents over three-quarters of the dollar volume of 
going private transactions  during this period. 
Throughout the paper, we classify MBOs by the year in which the final transaction 
terms of tlse buyout are set. Although this date is often the buyout announcement date, it 
can be some time after the initial announcement date.  We use this classification because the 
transaction setting date is the date on which capital investors commit to provide capital to 
the buyout at the actual deal  price.  Column  1 of Table 1 summarizes the distribution of 
MBOs by the year in which the final transaction terms are set. 
2.2  Pre-buyout and Post-buyout  Data 
For each successful MBO, information  describing  the transactions  is taken from 
proxy, 10-K, 13-E and 14-D statements and from the WSJ.7  Stock prices two months before 
the buyout is announced and at delisting are obtained from the Center for Research in 
The intent of this size criterion is to restrict the sample  to larger, more fully disclosed 
transactions. This criterion also lowers the likelihood that the reduction of regulatoiy costs is 
a major source of  value.  Savings on the Costs of preparing documents  for public shareholders 
and the SEC are likely to be small in relation to value in these transactions. 
6  The sample  includes  the buyout  of RJR Nabisco. We consider  this a management  buyout 
because  the buyout  sponsor, Kohlberg, Kravis and Roberts, explicitly noted that they  would offer 
equity to the ultimate management  team. 
One company did not file any SEC statements. The relevant information is taken from 
the WSJ article. 6 
Security Prices (CRSP) database and Standard & Poor's Daily Stock Price Record.  Other 
financial data are obtained from the COMPUSTAT  Tapes. 
Post-buyout  information  is available for  81 of the 124 MBOs in the  the list of 
SEC filing companies  available from Disclosure,  and Going Public: The IPO Reporter. 
3.  Buyout priciflg_ 
3t  Price to cash flow measures 
The first question we ask is how buyout prices have varied  over time relative to 
fundamentals. We measure the buyout price (which we also refer to as "total capital")  as the 
sum of (1) the market value paid for the firm's  equity; (2) the book value of the firm's 
outstanding debt; and (3) the fees paid in the transaction;  less (4) any excess cash removed 
from the firm to finance the buyout. 
In computing the market value paid for the firm's equity, we value non-cash 
distributions  paid to stockholders  (usually debt or preferred stock) using the market value of 
the securities as recorded in the Capital  Changes Reporter.  When we cannot obtain a value 
from the Capital Changes Reporter, we use the last traded price of the stock to estimate the 
combined  market value of  the cash and securities  distributed to old shareholders. We also 
value shares retained by insiders at the same price as the shares purchased from outside 
shareholders. 
We consider two primary measures of cash flow.  The first is earnings before interest, 
depreciation,  amortization,  and taxes (EBITDA). EBITDA is a measure of gross cash 
generated from operations, and thus represents an upper bound on the cash  available to pay 
investors.8  The second measure, net cash flow, equals EI3ITDA less capital expenditures. 
In a world  without taxes, net cash flow would be the primary component of the numerator in 
EBITDA is also referred to as operating income before depreciation and amortization. 7 
a discounting  analysis that sought to value a company under its current operating strategy. 
We calculate the two cash flow measures for the most recently completed  fiscal year 
available  when the proxy statement or 14D describing  the buyout is released.  Because  some 
of the huyouts are announced  well into the following fiscal year, we also have recalculated 
the cash flow measures for the most recent 12 months using quarterly financial statements. 
Unfortunately,  these computations are less reliable because some buyout firms do not report 
capital  expenditures,  depreciation, or both in those quarterly reports.  Nevertheless,  both 
sets of measures  generally  produce qualitatively  similar results.  In order to conserve space, 
we only report the results based on complete fiscal years in what follows. 
3.2  The behavior of  cash  flow to price ratios over time 
Columns  2 and 3 of table 1 display yearly median ratios of net cash  flow and 
EBITDA to total capital (or price). The ratios are broadly consistent  with the popular 
notion that buyout prices  rose relative to fundamentals  in the late 1980s.  The ratio of net 
cash flow to total capital declines  sharply from a median value of  8.39% in 1985 to a low of 
4.48% in 1987, before recovering  somewhat  to 7.27% in 1988.  The EBITDA-based measure 
confirms that 1987  was the worst year in our sample  in terms of cash flow to price,  and that 
1988 was also well below par. 
Here and in much of the analysis that follows, we use two methods to quantify the 
statistical significance of the temporal patterns in the data.  First, we measure the non- 
parametric (or rank) correlation between our variables and a simple annual time trend. 
Second, we use non-parametric rank  tests to compare the median values of the variables in 
three distinct  periods:  1980 to 1982 (or the "early 1980s"; 1983 to 1985 (or the "mid-1980s"); 
' When firms do not explicitly report depreciation  and amortization in their quarterly 
report, we assume that depreciation  and amortization  equal their values for  the preceding  fiscal 
year. 8 
and 1986 to 1988 (or the "late 1980s").  We do not include the 1989 deals among the late 
1980s buyouts because they appear different from those in 1986 to 1988, and there are too 
few such buyouts to warrant consideration  as a distinct regime. 
Table 1 shows that over the entire sample  period, both cash  flow to price ratios 
exhibit a statistically  significant downward trend.  Furthermore, both cash  flow ratios are 
statistically  lower (at the 5% level or better) for  late 1980s buyouts than for mid-1980s 
buyouts, and are statistically lower (at the 5% level or better) for mid-1980s buyouts than for 
early 1980s buyouts.  We repeated all these tests  using means and t-tests rather  than medians 
and rank tests.  The results are qualitatively  unaffected  and the patterns are somewhat more 
pronounced. Net cash flow to price ratios average 5.77%, 4.85%,  and 5.81%, respectively,  in 
1986, 1987, and 1988.  All other yearly averages  exceed 8.07% except  for 1983 buyouts which 
average  6.90%. 
The temporal patterns of the cash  flow to price ratios in columns 2 and 3 appear to 
reflect two distinct sets of  forces. First and most obviously, buyout valuations  moved with 
the general level of the stock market. Column 4 of table 1 shows the earnings to price ratio 
of the S&P  500 over the sample period. The fluctuations  of  cash  flow to price ratios for the 
buyout companies mirror market-wide  movements  in earnings-price  ratios. 
The tendency for buyout  prices  to track the level of the market as a whole can be 
seen more explicitly  by regressing  our cash  flow to price measures  against  market E/? ratios: 
CF/V  =  -0.93%  +  1.00 E / P.  R2 = .15  N=120 
(1.84)  (0.22) 
EBITDA / V  =  6.71%  +  0.82 E /  P.  R2 =  .21  N=124 
(1.12)  (0.14) 
where CF equals net cash flow, V equals total capital, and El? equals the earnings-price  ratio 
of the S&P 500 in the month the buyout  is priced.  (Standard errors are in parentheses.) 
These regressions  suggest that whatever factors  drove the overall stock market boom in 1987 9 
also played a role in the increased  buyout  valuations. 
But it also appears that there was a separate, buyout-specific  set of forces at work in 
the late 1980s.  Column  5 of table 1 presents the yearly median  premiums paid to 
shareholders. The premiums are measured as the percentage difference between the price 
paid for a firm's equity and the price two months before the first announcement of buyout or 
takeover activity.  Buyout  premiums  in the 1980s generally trended upward although this 
trend is not significant.  However,  the overall trend masks a significant  decline  in buyout 
premiums from the early to mid-1980s, and then a significant increase in the late 1980s. 
Median premiums  rose steadily from 25.7% in 1985 to 48.1% in 1988, almost doubling over 
this period. The increased premiums  in the late 1980s are consistent with a more 
competitive  or overheated buyout market at this time. 
The decline  in premiums  from the early to mid-1980s is more difficult to explain, 
although  several  possibilities  exist.  Pre-buyout stock prices may have reflected an increased 
probability  of takeover in the mid-1980s.  The mid-1980s also saw the introduction of tender 
offers initiated by the buyout investors and managers.  Initially, this may have improved the 
relative bidding position of  buyout investors  by giving competing  bidders less time to react. 
Whatever the reasons,  the higher premiums of  the early 1980s occurred when market E/F 
ratios were high.  The late 1980s were unique in terms of the combination  of high premiums 
and low market E/F ratios. 
3.3  Changes in buyout  company  risk over time 
In tables 2 and 3, we make a crude attempt to assess two possible  "fundamental" 
explanations  for the trend increase in buyout prices in the 1980s:  lower discount rates and 
higher growth expectations.  All else equal,  buyout price to cash flow multiples should 
increase if the overall risk of the company's  cash  flows (and, therefore the relevant discount 
rate) decrease, or if expectations  of future growth increase. 10 
Table 2 presents four different measures of risk.  First, we calculate  asset betas for 
the sample companies, where the asset beta equals the product of the equity  beta  and the 
ratio of the market value of equity to the value  of total capital two months  before the first 
buyout announcement. We calculate equity betas using the Scholes-Williams  estimation 
technique, daily returns, and the CRSP value-weighted  index over the period 560 to 40 days 
before the buyout  announcement.10'11 
Column  1 presents the yearly sample median asset betas.  The asset betas trend 
downward  over time, but this trend is small and not significant.  Furthermore, the asset betas 
in the early, mid-, and late 1980s subsarnples are not significantly different from one 
another -- there  is no indication that buyout firm risk is significantly low in the late 1980s. 
In fact, the median asset beta for 1987 of 0.76 is greater than the unconditional  sample 
median of 0.63. 
The second measure of  systematic  risk we use is the industzy  earnings beta calculated 
by Bernanke et al. (1990).  This beta is the coefficient from a regression  of the growth  rate 
of (two-digit SIC code) industry real earnings on the growth rate of real GNP from 1970 to 
1988.  These earnings betas trend upward  over time, but this trend is small and not 
significant.  The earnings betas in the early, mid-, and late 1980s, again, are not significantly 
different from one another. The earnings betas, therefore, also fail to provide evidence that 
buyout companies in the late 1980s were less risky than those involved in earlier deals. 
Column 3 presents a measure of  total risk (both systematic  and unsystematic) 
calculated  using  financial data for the buyout  companies -- the standard deviation of the 
growth rate of operating margins  (where operating  margin  equals the ratio of EBITDA to 
Thirteen sample companies  either do not appear in the CRSP database or do not have 
a sufficient number of returns available to calculate equity betas. 
Our results  are similar  when we use an equal-weighted  index to calculate betas.  Our 
asset beta calculation  assumes that pre-buyout  debt betas equal  0.  The results, however, are not 
sensitive to this assumption  because  pre-buyout  debt is only 22.7% of pre-buyout  total  capital. 11 
sales).  This is calculated  using up to ten years, but not fewer than six years of pre-financial 
data.  This measure trends upward  throughout the 1980s, but not significantly.  In addition, 
the late 1980s buyouts  have significantly greater risk (at the 5% level) than those in the mid- 
1980s.  Again,  this  is clearly not consistent  with a decrease in the risk of late 1980s buyout 
companies. 
Finally, column 4 presents a measure of industiy total risk used by Bernanke et al. -- 
the standard deviation of the growth rate of industry real earnings. The pattern of this 
industry measure is almost identical to that of our firm-specific measure. The trend is 
positive (and significant at the 5% level), and the risk is significantly higher for buyouts of 
the late 1980s than for those in the mid-1980s. 
An essentially similar story,  therefore, emerges from all four risk measures. None 
give any indication that buyout firm risk  was lower in the late 1980s than in the earlier 
periods.  Indeed, the total risk measures  suggest that buyout firm risk increased  throughout 
the 1980s, and particularly in the late 1980s. 
3A  Projected  growth over  time 
An alternative explanation  for changing buyout prices relative to cash flows is 
increased growth  expectations,  It is possible that over time, as practitioners became more 
experienced  with buyout structures, they revised  their forecasts as to how rapidly buyout cash 
flows could be expected  to grow.  All but 19 of the companies  in our sample include  some 
post-buyout financial projections in the 14D or proxy statement describing the buyout. The 
projections include forecasts of future sales in all cases, forecasts of EBITDA (or EBIT) in 12 
most cases, and, less frequently,  forecasts of capital expenditures.12 
In what follows, we divide  projected growth into two components:  the total projected 
growth  from the last pre-buyout year to the first post-buyout year and the compound annual 
growth rate from the first post-buyout  year to the nth post-buyout  year, where n is the last 
post-buyout  year with forecast sales.  The former measure can be interpreted as expected 
immediate operating changes  or short-term growth while the latter measure can be 
interpreted as expected long-term  growth.  We exclude projections  of pre- to post-buyout 
growth when the post-buyout  projections assume that asset sales have taken place and no 
comparable  pre-buyout measures exist.  Similarly, we exclude projections  of  post-buyout 
growth when they include asset sales. 
Columns  1 to 4 of table 3 present our two growth measures for  both sales and 
EBITDA. The patterns are generally  inconsistent  with the hypothesis that growth 
expectations  are systematically  more optimistic  in the late 1980s.  The trend for all four 
measures is negative.  And, none of these growth measures is higher in the 1986 to 1988 
period than in the two earlier periods.  Columns  5 presents  the expected short-term growth 
in operating margins.  Unlike  the sales and EBITDA measures,  this measure includes 
transactions  with planned asset sales.  Again, there is no significant time trend. 
Columns  6 and 7 present projected short-term  growth rates in capital expenditures 
and capital expenditures  to sales for  those companies that reported capital expenditure 
projections. We find that the medians for the entire sample are negative  -- companies  enter 
into buyouts planning to cut capital expenditures.  Again, however, the 1986 to 1988 buyouts 
are not characterized  by significantly greater projected capital expenditure cuts than those in 
12  The projections  we present are nominal projections. in most cases, we do not have the 
inflation forecasts used  by the buyout investors.  Except for the early 1980s  when  expected 
inflation is high, the variation  in the growth rates of the nominal projections is probably much 
larger than that of expected inflation. 13 
the earlier periods13  Although we do not present them separately,  the trends of short-term 
growth  in net cash flow are not significant. 
Taken together, the results in this section  suggest that buyout prices rose over the 
1980s relative to observable  measures of fundamental  value such as cash flow, risk, and 
growth expectations. Part of this increase reflects the same market-wide  forces that drive the 
S&P 500 to historically  high levels in August 1987.  But there is also some evidence of a 
separate, buyout specific  component  to the run up after 1985. 
4.  Aggregate debt burdens of buyout companies 
Higher buyout  prices  may lead to lower returns for buyout investors,  but they do not 
necessarily lead to a higher likelihood of  financial  distress. That likelihood also depends on 
buyout financial  structure, which we examine in this section.  As a first cut, we lump all 
forms of debt together and examine some simple statistics  on the proportion of  debt to total 
capital and on the coverage of contractual obligations. 
Column  1 of table 4 presents the yearly medians of  total post-buyout  debt to total 
capital where total post-buyout  debt equals the sum of (the market value of) new debt issued 
to finance the buyout and (the book value of) pre-buyout debt retained4 The market 
value of most new debt is equal to its face value.  When  it is not, usually in the case of new 
13  The projections for EBITDA and operating margins are slightly higher than the actual 
results reported by Kaplan  (1989b).  He finds that EBITDA in the first (second) post-buyout 
year is 15.6% (30.7%) higher than in the last pre-buyout  year.  Similarly, operating margins in 
the first (second) post-buyout year are 7.1% (119%) higher than in the last pre-buyout year. 
The overall sample  median  projections -- 12.8%  and 22.9% cuts in capital expenditures and 
capital  expenditures  to sales respectively -- are roughly consistent  with Kaplan (1989b)  who finds 
actual  reductions of 21.1% and 23.3%. 
14  The use of the book value rather  than the market  value of pre-buyout debt has a very 
minor effect because the median  book value of retained pre-buyout  debt to total debt is only 
6.7%. 14 
debt issued  directly to selling shareholders (so-called  "cram down" debt), we obtain the 
market value from the Capital Changes Reporter. 
The median debt to total capital ratios appear remarkably  constant between 1980 and 
1988, never dropping  below 86% (in 1985) and never rising above 907% (in 1986). The 
relative uniformity of the debt ratios goes beyond the pattern in the yearly medians. Over 
our entire sample, the 25th percentile debt ratio is 83.8% while the 75th percentile ratio is 
92.0%.  Although the changes in debt to total capital ratios do not appear to be economically 
meaningful,  the ratios in 1986 to 1988 (90.5%) are statistically  greater than those in 1980 to 
1982 (88.0%) and 1983 to 1985 (86.5%).  The time trend is also positive  at the 5% level. 
Our  measure of total debt may understate the amount of  debt in the capital structure 
because it excludes preferred stock with  fixed commitments.  In several cases, such preferred 
stock is exchangeable  into subordinated debt. Accordingly,  column 2 of table 4 presents the 
yearly medians of  post-buyout  common stock to total capital, where post-buyout common 
stock includes preferred stock convertible  into common stock (but not straight preferred 
stock or preferred stock convertible  into debt).  Thcse medians appear to vary somewhat 
more over time than those for debt to total capital. The median percentages of common 
stock in buyout company capital structure are lowest from 1986 to 1988, reaching a low of 
only 4.04% for 1987 deals. Again the median ratio of 5.5% from 1986 to 1988 is 
significantly lower than the medians of 9.1% and 8.8% for early and mid-1980s buyouts. 
The slight increase in the debt ratios is an interesting  and somewhat  puzzling aspect 
of  buyout financial structures. For example, in spite of the projections  data presented in 
section 3.4, the high prices  paid relative to cash flows in 1987 will no doubt strike many as 
prima fade evidence that 1987 buyouts  were associated with more optimistic  growth 
expectations  than those in other years.  But if the benefits of the 1987 deals were more 
"back-loaded"  in time, shouldn't  firms have taken on less debt relative to total value, so that 
they could afford to meet interest  payments with their comparatively  lower short-term cash 15 
flows? 
To explore this issue further, the remainder of table 4 presents several measures of 
the adequacy  of current cash  flows relative  to contractual obligations. These measures use 
net cash  flow and EBITDA in the last full year before the buyout. We calculate expected 
interest payments from the interest rates and debt amounts projected in the proxy or 14D 
statements describing the buyouts.  Because  most of the bank debt in these transactions is 
priced  at a spread over the London Interbank Offering  Rate (LIBOR) or the prime rate, we 
calculate expected  interest payments on the bank debt using the rates in effect  at the date 
uncertainty about the bid is resolved.  This  may underestimate true expected interest 
payments in the later deals because many of the later buyouts  involved interest rate swaps 
that effectively converted some floating rate debt into fixed rate obligations.  Because the 
yield curve has an upward slope during most of the sample period, the fixed swap rates are 
greater than the floating rates. 
Columns 3 and 4 compare net cash flow and EBITDA to expected total interest 
payments in the first post-buyout  year.  Consistent  with the lower cash  flow to price ratios 
and constant leverage  ratios, we find a negative time trend for both interest coverage 
measures,  with  both  net cash  flow and EBITDA to interest  reaching a minimum  in 1987 and 
1988.  However, because the ratios in 1986 are at least as high as those in previous years, the 
time trend is not significant  for net cash  flow, and is significant  only at the 10% level for 
EB  ITDA.15 
The high  1986 ratios may be  due  to the fact  that long- and, particularly,  short-term 
interest rates reached a minimum in 1986.  The median ratios for 1987 and 1988 buyouts  of 0.60 
and  1.11  are significantly lower than the ratios of 0.75 and 1.25 for pre-1987 buyouts at the 6% 
and 1% levels, respectively.  The relative  lack of  variation in the interest coverage  ratios may 
surprise some readers. Wigmore  (1990) presents  similar EBITDA to interest ratios for  all junk 
bond issues (not just buyout related issues) in the 1980s, and finds a steady decline.  His annual 
ratios exceed 2.73 before 1983, average 1.74 between 1983 and 1985, and drop to 1.26 between 
1986 and 1988.  It is likely that the large  decline in his sample is caused  by a shift to merger and 
buyout related issues over time, 16 
The ratios in columns  3 and 4 use total interest obligations, which include both cash 
and non-cash interest.  Non-cash  interest  is associated with deferred interest debt which 
includes zero-coupon  and pay-in-kind  (P1K) bonds.  Including non-cash interest payments 
may present a misleading  picture because the use of such payments increased significantly in 
the second half of the 1980s (as we show below, in section 6).  In fact, they may have been 
introduced precisely to allow firms with more "back-loaded"  cash flows to safely assume high 
levels of  debt. 
Columns  5 and 6 of table 4 repeat our coverage calculations using cash interest 
payments that exclude interest payments on deferred  interest debt.  As expected,  this 
adjustment improves the relative standing of the coverage  ratios of the later deals.  None of 
the time trends or period comparisons presented in the table is significant.16 
Although interest coverage is an often-used  measure of financial soundness, it does 
not fully capture a firm's ability  to meet all its debt-related obligations. Cash flow must also 
be devoted to making principal  repayments.  Ninety of the transactions in our sample  report 
a principal  repayment  schedule for the bank debt portion of the capital structure.  Column 7 
displays the ratio of required debt repayments  to EI3ITDA  in the first two post-buyout  years 
for these ninety transactions. Required repayments  rise sharply over time,  with an especially 
pronounced break between 1985 and 1986, when  principal repayments rise by a factor of 
more than 2.7.  The time trend and period comparisons  all show increases in this ratio that 
are significant  at the 1% level. 
Columns 8 and 9 repeat our  coverage  calculations, but now consider how net cash 
flow and El)  ITDA compare to total cash obligations, which we define as the sum of cash 
interest and one-half of the first two years' required principal repayments. These eoverages 
are now substantially  (and significantly) lower for buyouts of 1986 to 1988 than for earlier 
16 
However, the EBITDA to cash interest ratio is still significantly lower (at  the 10% level) 
for 1987 and 1988 buyouts than for pre-1987  buyouts. 17 
deals.  For example,  the median ratio of EBITDA to cash obligations  is always above one 
before 1986, but falls to between  .66 and .76 for the 1986-88 period.  Similarly, the median 
ratio of net cash flow to cash obligations, which was always above 0.56 before 1985, does not 
exceed 041 during  1986-88. 
The  cash coverage ratios after 1985 imply a sharp deterioration in the ability of 
buyout firms to meet their total debt-related obligations  out of operating cash  flows.  For 
example, a buyout with the 1988 median net cash flow to cash obligation ratio of  0.41 -- the 
highest median of the 1986 to 1988 period -- would need to increase net cash flow by 144% 
(0.5910.41) to meet cash obligations  with net cash  flow.  This is a much larger increase than 
those found in Kaplan (1989b) for a sample of management  buyouts announced between 
1979 and 1985.  He finds net cash  flows in the first three post-buyout  years are 41%, 59%, 
and 96% higher, respectively,  than net cash  flow in the last pre-buyout  year.17 1 light of 
this historical performance data, it is hard to see how operating cash  flows could be expected 
to meet required debt service payments. 
These coverage numbers, however, present only part of the overall picture on financial 
soundness.  First, as Shleifer  and Vishny (1991)  emphasize,  asset sales represent an 
alternative means of generating  the cash to make debt-related payments. The acceleration in 
principal  repayment  schedules in the late 1980s almost certainly led to an increased  reliance 
on (and expectations  of) asset sales  Second  even if planned asset sales fail to matenahze 
and required payments cannot be met, this need not necessarily spell disaster.  The costs at 
this point will depend critically on the ability of  creditors to restructure their claims in an 
efficient manner. 
In sum then, the data in this section suggest  that the buyouts of the late 1980s may 
17 Holding assets constant, Kaplan  (1989b) finds increases of  43%, 66%,  and 79% over the 
same post-buyout  periods. 18 
have had a higher ex-ante probability  of winding up in a restructuring situation, particularly if 
asset sales plans were subject to some uncertainty.  The data have thus far had less to say 
about the possible costs involved in such restructurings. 
5.  Senior bank debt and the role of asset sales 
We now focus our attention on specific components  of  buyout capital structures. The 
most senior part of the capital structure for most of our MBOs takes the form of a term 
loan (and, often, an accompanying  revolving credit loan) arranged by one or more 
commercial  banks. We refer  to these loans as bank debt.'8  Table 5 presents the annual 
medians for several bank debt characteristics. 
The first column in the table shows the median value of the ratio of bank debt to 
total debt by year.  Bank debt represents over 70% of the debt in 1982, 1983, and 1984.  In 
1985, this pattern breaks  distinctly, with bank debt dropping  to 42% of all debt.  After 1985, 
the ratio stabilizes, ranging between 52% and 57% from 1986 to 1989.  Interestingly,  the 
decline in bank debt ratios coincides with  an increased  usage of public low-grade debt.  We 
discuss  this issue in more detail in section 6 below. 
In the second and third columns, we report the interest rate terms of the bank loans. 
In most of the deals, the interest rate on the bank debt is set as the minimum of a spread 
over the prime rate or a spread over LIBOR. We report both the median spreads over 
prime and LIBOR by year.  (In the few cases the term loan and revolving credit loan spread 
differ, we use the value-weighted  average of the spreads.)  The spreads are statistically 
significantly higher in the late 1980s than in the mid-1980s.  However, in economic terms,  the 
spread differences  appear to be remarkably stable over time.  The median value of the 
prime-based  spread  rises gradually  from 1.25% in 1982 to 1.50% in 1985, and stays at exactly 
18  We also  classify similarly structured term loans made by bank-like organizations  such as 
General Electric Credit as bank debt. 19 
150% for the remainder of the 1980s. 
The lack of  variation in spreads shows up strongly in the cross section  as well.  When 
we pool alt deals between  1985 and 1989, both the 25th and 75th percentile prime-based 
spreads equal 1.50%.  The uniformity in loan pricing in conjunction  with the uniformity in 
total debt to capital ratios from the previous section is puzzling.  If we take a heterogeneous 
group of companies, and impose the same aggressive capital structure on all of them, one 
might expect a great deal of  variation in the riskiness  of the debt, and, hence, a good deal of 
variation in its pricing. 
There are several possible  answers to this puzzle.  First, it might be the case that 
some banks are simply not doing a very good or sophisticated  job of pricing their LBO loans. 
The successes enjoyed in some of the deals of the early 1980s may have led banks to become 
more optimistic about the prospects for later deals.  Given the inherent incentive problems 
associated with deposit insurance,  it is possible that an underpricing  of risky loans took place. 
A second factor which might help explain pricing  behavior is the development  of the 
inter-bank loan sales market. As documented  by Gorton and Pennachi  (1991), the volume of 
loan sales grew enormously  in the 1980s, from $27 billion in the second quarter of 1983 to 
$291 billion in the third quarter of 1989.  By facilitating  the diversification of LBO loans, 
loan sales may have made it rational for banks to accept lower expected returns. 
Alternatively,  to the extent that moral hazard problems  exist for risk-taking in banks, the loan 
sales market may have allowed larger banks that originated  LBO loans to sell them to 
smaller  banks more eager to accept high  risks for lower returns.19 
A final, and related factor, is the level of fee income earned by banks in buyout 
transactions. Columns 4 of table 5 shows a dramatic rise in the level of fees over  time, going 
19  Another important aspect  of  the loan sales market concerns  its implications  for the 
renegotiation of distressed  loans.  We touch on this issue below. 20 
from .40% of the bank loan in 1983 to 2.49% in 1988.  The increased  fee income may be 
economically  equivalent  to higher interest rates.  Accordingly, we calculate a fee-adjusted 
interest rate and a corresponding  fee-adjusted  spread to the reference rate.  For example, if a 
bank loan requires a 2.49% up front fee, the "fee adjusted  spread"  on a 7 year loan with level 
principal repayments  is 2.37% over prime (when  prime is 10%), not the unadjusted spread of 
1.50%. 
Column 5 of table 5 reports the annual median fee-adjusted  spreads over the prime 
rate.  The fee adjusted spread over prime jumps noticeably  from 1.59% in 1984 to 2.13% in 
1985 and remains  between  2.12% and 2.24% from 1985 to 1988 -- there  is both a statistically 
and economically  significant  increase in this spread over time. 
There are, however, two reasons why treating fees and interest  income as 
economically  equivalent can be misleading.  The first relates to the loan sales market. 
Although hard data are not available,  conversations  with bankers indicate that when a loan is 
sold, some of the fee income is retained by the originating  bank.  This appears to have been 
the case even when the originating  bank sold off most of the loan. If  so, the fee-adjusted 
spreads reported in table 5 overstate the returns to banks that actually fund the loan and 
bear the risk.  In the extreme case, the unadlusted spread  is the correct measure of the 
funding  bank's return. 
Second, banks might plausibly prefer fee income because of capital regulations -- 
banks care about the book value of their net worth. Since fee income shows up in earnings 
(and hence flows to net worth) in the first year of the buyout, it can have  a higher shadow 
value to banks than an economically  equivalent interest rate.  The greater fee income we find 
in late 1980s buyouts may have tempted banks into making buyout loans that offered a less 
favorable risk-return tradeoff.2° 
20 
Although we are unaware  of them, we acknowledge that tax or  other considerations  may 
also have come into play. 21 
Thus far, our narrow focus on interest spreads has led us to ignore a potentially 
important set of "non-price  terms of credit." Bankers  have a number of tools other than 
interest rates at their disposal that can be used to improve their risk-return tradeoff.  For 
example, as deal  pricing became more aggressive relative  to cash flow, banks may have 
required more collateral or tighter covenants.  We have already seen that banks reduced the 
amount they loaned in later deals.  Non-price credit terms are particularly relevant given that 
banks are the senior lenders in the buyout transactions. Because bank debt is typically only 
50% of the value of the company, it is possible that the banks could structure their loans to 
virtually eliminate default losses.  If so, it would make sense to lend at the same relatively 
low interest rate in all deals.  Interestingly,  this logic is consistent with Diamond (1991). He 
presents a model  in which the senior lenders, i.e. banks, react to changes in credit quality by 
adjusting  the sue of the loan rather than the interest rate. 
We do not have comprehensive  data on non-price credit terms for the bank loans in 
our sample.  I lowever, the principal repayment schedules for the bank debt examined  in the 
previous section  do provide some evidence that banks were, over time, increasingly  taking 
some steps to protect themselves.  As noted earlier, the acceleration  of  repayment schedules 
appears to reflect an increased reliance on asset sales.  Indeed, the more rapid repayment 
schedules (and the correspondingly  tighter coverages)  seen  in many  deals in the late 1980s 
would seem to be a mechanism  for forcing  buyout companies to sell assets in order to raise 
cash. 
We have some data that allows us to examine the role of  asset sales more explicitly. 
Many of the proxy and 14D statements describing the buyouts note post-buyout asset sales 
intentions,  although these intentions are not necessarily obligations.  Columns 7 and 8 
present annual medians for both (i) the fraction of deals where there are explicit plans to sell 
assets;  and (ii) the amount of  anticipated asset sales as a percentage  of total capital for those 
deals whcre asset sales are planned.  The numbers indicate a moderate increase in 22 
importance for expected asset sales over time.  Asset sales are expected  in 214% of the pre- 
1983 MBOs,  27.0% of the 1983 to 1985 MBOs, and 40.9% of the 1986 to 1988 MBOs. 
These differences  are not, however, statistically significant.  The asset sales are a roughly 
constant fraction of  total capital, at a median  15.5%, 19.8%,  and 18.5%, respectively, for the 
three periods. 
The time series trend towards deteriorating  coverage of debt-related obligations  is 
thus matched to some extent by a trend towards  increased reliance on asset sales.  This 
correlation appears more strongly in the cross-section.  In columns 1 and 2 of table 6, we 
regress  the ratios of net cash  flow and EBITDA  to expected  cash debt obligations  against a 
dummy  variable that equals 1 for buyouts  with expected  asset sales,  Both regressions also 
include  dummy variables that control for the year of the buyout. Regression I shows that 
buyouts  with expected asset sales are associated  with coverage ratios 0.26 lower (significant 
at the 1% level) than buyouts without  expected  asset sales.  For example.  a 1987 buyout 
without expected asset sales is associated  with a net cash flow to cash debt obligation ratio of 
0.39 (0.90- 0.51) while one with expected asset sales is associated  with a ratio of only 0.13 
(0.39-0.26).  Regression  2 indicates  that expected asset sales are associated  with a 0.27 
decrease (significant at the 1% level) in the ratio of EBITDA to cash debt obligations. 
A correlation between tight coverages  and the use of asset sales is not, in itself, 
terribly surprising -- the two features  seem clearly complementary.  More striking is the fact 
that asset sales are also associated  with more aggressive pricing of buyout transactions. 
Table 6 also presents regressions in which our pricing measures are regressed against  the 
expected asset sale and yearly dummy  variables. The table documents that expected asset 
sales are associated  with  a statistically significant decline in net cash flow and EBITDA to 
total capital ratios.  Regression  3 associates  asset sales with a decrease in net cash  flow to 
capital of  2.4% (significant  at the 5% level).  For example, a 1987 huyout without expected 
asset sales is associated  with a net cash  flow to total capital ratio of 5.9% (11.6 - 5.7) while 23 
one with  expected asset sales is associated  with a ratio of  only  3.5% (5.9-2.4). 
Regressions  3 and 4 in table 6 are interesting because it is not obvious on theoretical 
grounds why plans to sell assets should make a firm more valuable in the aggregate.  The 
first order effect of asset sales would seem to be to transfer value from junior to senior 
creditors, not to create new value.21  It is understandable  why senior bank lenders would be 
willing to lend to more aggressively priced  deals if they could force asset sales.  It is less 
clear why junior lenders would  be willing to participate in such deals. 
To summarize  the results of this section:  senior bank lenders appear to have placed a 
small emphasis on interest rate spreads in their structuring  of buyout loans.  Rather, it seems 
that they attempted to protect themselves by reducing the fraction of the total debt they 
provided and by imposing more rapid repayment schedules  (which could only be met by 
firms selling assets and giving the proceeds  to the banks) on the more aggressively priced 
deals.  While these adjustments may have made sense from the banks' senior perspective, 
they raise two sorts of  questions:  (1) who and why were the junior lenders agreeing to this 
type of structure; and (2) what are the implications  of  such a structure for the likelihood of 
financial  distress? 
6.  Subordinated  debt 
We now turn to an examination  of the subordinated debt in our sample transactions. 
In  what follows, we focus on non-price attributes of this debt -- private placement  versus 
public  issuance,  the use of deferred interest securities, and the use of "strip" financing 
21  This is easily seen by considering  the polar case where the asset sale generates enough 
cash to completely  repay the senior debt.  In this case, the use of  asset sales makes the senior 
debt riskless, thereby increasing its value while shifting more risk Onto the junior debt. 
See, however  Shleifer and Vishny  (1991) who offer a theory that a  liquid asset-sale 
market can lead to higher asset values for companies  that can readily sell off assets. 24 
techniques. In contrast to our analysis of the senior bank debt, we pay very little attention to 
promised coupon yields.  Given the extremely  junior nature of some of this debt, variations 
in promised  yields are likely to be relatively uninformative  about variations in expected 
returns.  In other words, promised  yields probably do not give an accurate picture of  "true 
subordinated debt pricing. 
Table 7 presents yearly averages of several characteristics  of the subordinated debt 
used to finance  the sample buyouts.  Column 2 shows the fraction of buyouts financed using 
publicly  issued low-grade, or  junk bonds -- bonds rated less than BBB  by Standard  and 
Poor's or Baa by Moody's.  Only one pre-1985  buyout used public junk bonds.  In contrast, 
over 54% of the subsequent buyouts used them.  To the extent that free-rider and 
information problems make it more difficult to renegotiate  widely-held public debt than 
closely-held  private debt, the increased reliance on junk bonds may be expected to increase 
the costs of financial  distress.  Gilson, John, and Lang (1990) find evidence consistent with 
this -- financially distressed firms are more likely to restructure debt outside of bankruptcy 
the higher the proportion of private bank debt to total liabilities and the fewer the classes of 
debt outstanding. 
Many buyouts also issued a second  type of widely-held debt as part of the buyout 
financing -- commonly called "cram down" debt.  Cram down is debt issued  by the new 
An example helps make this clear.  Suppose we have two LBOs. In the first, the senior 
debt has a slow repayment schedule,  and the subordinated debt receives  cash interest starting 
right  away.  in the second, the senior debt has  a  vcry  fast repayment schedule and the 
subordinated debt receives no cash interest for  several years.  Suppose further that the coupon 
on the second LBO's subordinated debt is 200 basis points higher.  This does not say much 
about the relative expected returns on the two junk bonds.  The subordinated debt in the second 
deal is effectively more junior and will expect  to suffer greater losses in adverse states.  For 
evidence  on the returns and risk of  low grade debt, see Asquith,  Mullins, and Wolff (1989) and 
Kaplan and Stein (1990). 
Interest rate spreads  will also be  unreliable  when subordinated  debtholders invest in post- 
buyout equity.  Such debtholders may be  willing to take accept lower interest rates in exchange 
for the equity  "kicker."  As we document below, the use of such arrangements changed  over 
time. 25 
buyout firm as part of the payment to the pre-buyout shareholders to take the company 
private. Because  the pre-buyout shares are widely-held, so is the cram down debt.  Column  3 
also shows an increased  reliance on the use of  "cram  down" debt, particularly  after 1984. 
Column 4 of table 7 presents the ratio of new public buyout debt -- combined junk 
and cram down debt --  to total capital over time.  Consistent  with the previous  two columns, 
the ratio rises sharply in 1985.  Before  1985, new  public debt is a small  fraction  of total 
capital;  from 1985 and beyond, it always exceeds 17.5% of total capital. The increase over 
time is significant  at the 1% level.  Note that these are unconditional  averages,  including 
buyouts both with and without  widely-held debt.  These averages,  therefore, understate the 
importance of new public debt in those transactions which utilize such debt. 
As we noted earlier, the increased use of public subordinated debt, particularly  junk 
bonds, coincides  with the adjustment  by banks to reduce the size of their loans.  The time- 
series relation is very strong.  Without controlling for the year of the transaction, the ratio of 
bank debt to total debt is 11.8% lower (significant at 1%) in buyouts that rely on junk bonds 
than in buyouts that do not.  Column  1 of table 8 presents a cross-sectional  regression that 
uses year-dummies  to control for the time series variation. In this regression,  the ratio of 
bank debt to total debt is still 6.2% lower in buyouts  using junk bonds.  This is significant  at 
the 7% level using a one-tailed test (but only at the 13% level using a two-tailed test). 
Table 7 points out two additional trends in subordinated debt financing, both 
significant  at the 5% level or better.  First, columns  5 and 6 show that the use of deferred 
interest debt increases after 1984.  Such debt is used in only  12% of pre-1985  buyouts, but in 
more than 50% of  the buyouts after 1984.  Similarly, deferred interest debt as a percentage 
of total capital increases as well, exceeding 8.5% in all years after 1986. 
The increase in deferred interest on the subordinated debt has, all else equal, a 
similar effect to the faster senior debt repayment -- it further ')uniorizes"  the subordinated 
debt, potentially transferring value to the senior bank lenders. In buyouts that use deferred 26 
interest debt, most of the bank debt is scheduled  to be paid off before the buyout firm 
begins cash  payments on the deferred interest debt. 
Interestingly,  this juniorization appears to have occurred disproportionately  with 
public subordinated debt.  The majority of deferred  interest debt is public debt -- either junk 
or cram down.  Of the 59 buyouts that do not use junk or cram down debt, only 3 issue 
deferred interest debt.  In contrast, deferred interest debt is issued  by 44 of 65 buyouts that 
issue public debt. 
The juniorization  of public subordinated debt also appears to have  had consequences 
for  the overall  pricing of transactions. There is a strong time series relation between our 
pricing measures and the use of  junk debt.  This relation also appears, albeit moderately,  in 
the crosssection.  Columns 2 and 3 of table 8 regress our pricing measures against the junk 
debt and yearly dummy  variables. The regressions  indicate the use of  junk debt is associated 
with a decline in both net cash  flow and EBITDA to total capital ratios of 1.6%.  The 
coefficient  in the EBITDA to capital regression is significant  at the 5% level.24 
Finally,  at the same time  public subordinated debt became more juniorized, the use of 
strip financing declined. The last two columns of table 7 present the percentage of 
transactions using some form of strip  financing  and strip debt as a fraction of total capital. 
Strip financing  is present when lenders invest in post-buyout  equity.  In most cases of strip 
financing, it is the subordinated debtholders who hold the equity.  However, we also include 
several cases in which the senior lender or lenders  purchase  equity.  Over 70% of the 
buyouts before 1984 utilized some form of strip-financing.  The debt owned by strip  holders 
equalled at least 24.5% of  the total capital of these buyouts.  In contrast, fewer than 25% of 
the post-1985  buyouts used strip financing, with strip debt worth at most 12% of total 
capital. 
24  Our results are  economically  similar  when we  dislinguish  between buyouts financed  with 
junk or cram down from those financed with no public debt. 27 
As in the case of  deferred interest debt, the use of  strip financing is related to the use 
of widely-held debt, although in this case the relation goes the opposite way.  Over 59% 
(35/59) of the buyouts that did not use public debt used strip financing, compared to fewer 
than 22% (14/65) of the buyouts that did use public debt. 
Overall, the patterns in table 7 indicate that over the later part of the 1980s, 
management  buyouts dramatically  increased  their use of public subordinated debt.  At the 
same time, the public subordinated debt appears to have been juniorized through an increase 
in the use of deferred interest payments  and an acceleration in the principal repayments on 
senior debt.  This juniorization is associated  with both a time-series  and cross-sectional 
decline in the ratio of operating cash  flows to price. 
Our analysis also raises questions about possible value destruction associated  with 
costly financial distress. The fact that buyouts  using  public subordinated debt were less likely 
to use strip financing than those using only  private subordinated debt would seem to further 
increase the potential for problems in a renegotiation  situation. We return to these issues  in 
section 9. 
7.  Equity,  management  and buvout investor  incentives. 
The third  and final source of  potential problems concerns the incentives of  buyout 
investors. One of the supposed spurs to improved  performance in buyouts is the increased 
equity stake of  management. Managers  who invest  a large portion of their wealth in and own 
a large percentage of post-buyout equity might be expected to manage  better.  As we noted 
in table 4, the percentage of common stock to total capital declined after 1985, just as 
pricing  and coverages  became more aggressive.  Table 9 considers the change in equity 
ownership  in more detail. 
Columns  1 and 2 present the median percentage of pre-buyout and post-buyout equity 28 
(fully diluted to account for stock options) owned by the post-buyout management  team. 
Before the buyout, the new management  team owns a median of 5.0% of equity.  This 
percentage  trends upward, peaking at more than 8% in both 1987 and 1988.  The median 
management  equity ownership of the post-buyout  company is 22.3%.  This percentage  also 
trends upward. Column  3 combines the information  in columns I and 2 by calculating  the 
ratio of the percentage of post- to pre-buyout  equity owned by the management team.  This 
ratio provides  a measure of the change  in the intensity of the relationship between 
managerial  effort and compensation.  The median ratio for the 102 buyouts  with pre- and 
post-buyout  information  is 4.14.  The ratio trends downward,  but not significantly  so. 
Although buyouts are almost always associated with  increases in management's 
percentage  stock ownership, it is also important to recognize  that managers  typically "cash 
out" in dollar terms at the time of the transaction.  This cashing out could have important 
adverse  incentive  effects.  In particular, managers may be more tempted to go along with (or 
encourage)  an overpriced or poorly structured deal the larger the capital gain they are able 
to realize on the shares they sell at the time of the buyout. 
Column 4 of  table 9 presents the ratio of the dollar value of post- to pre-huyout 
equity owned by the management  team.  The median ratio is 0.460, indicating  that the 
management  team typically invests less than half as much in post-buyout  equity as it invested 
in pre-buyout  equity.  This ratio drops sharply after 1984.  Before  1984, the median  ratio is 
0.57.  From 1985 to 1988, the ratio is 0.35.  This difference is significant  at the 5% level. 
The time trend of this variable over the 1980s is also significantly negative at the 10% level. 
These results,  therefore, provide  evidence that management  "cashed-out"  more and risked 
less in management  buyouts in the late 1980s. 
It has also been suggested  that managers increasingly  used buyouts as a mechanism  to 
escape from hostile takeovers. According  to this view, as hostile takeover pressure increases, 
managers  will want to maintain control at any cost.  Column  5 of table 9 presents the annual 29 
fraction of transactions  subject to overt hostile pressure. We define hostile pressure as (1) 
the presence of a competing takeover bid; or (2) the presence of a stockholder  who owns at 
least 5% of the company's  stock and is opposed in some way by management  in the six 
months before the buyout. Surprisingly, we do not find a significant  time trend in hostile 
pressure for these firms -- such pressure has always been  present in larger buyouts. 
Management investors are not the only parties driven by incentives. So are buyout 
promoters, investment  banks, and lenders. Most buyout participants are compensated both 
with long-term security interests and with up front fees.  As up front fees increase, the 
incentive to produce long-term  payoffs decreases,  other things equal.  As we showed in 
section 5, banks required higher up front fees in the later 1980s than before. Column 6 of 
table 9 indicates that the same is true for total buyout related fees. The largest portion 
of these fees are paid to buyout promoters, investment  banks, and commercial banks. The 
upward  trend in fees is significant at the 1% level,  The column indicates that total fees to 
total capital make their largest jump in the late 1980s.  They range from 2.05% to 2.66% 
before 1985, rise to 3,69% in 1985, and peak at 5.97% in 1988. 
The results in this section suggest  that the more aggressive pricing and financial 
structure in later buyouts were accompanied  by weaker incentives  to insure that the deals 
would succeed.  Buyout managers apparently cashed out a larger fraction of their net worth 
while other buyout participants extracted  larger up front fees in the late 1980s. 
8.  Ex post results 
Until now, we have restricted our analysis to information  available at the time of the 
Total buyout related  fees  are almost always listed in the  proxy  or 14D  statement 
describing  the buyout.  We do not present separate fees for different  parties because these fees 
are not always disaggregated. 30 
buyout.  Our results suggest  that the ex ante likelihood of financial distress increased over 
time.  The cx post incidence of financial distress  will be determined by both the cx ante 
likelihood of distress and unexpected (poor) post-buyout  performance. In this section, we 
present preliminary  evidence on (1) the extent to which management  buyouts have been 
unable to meet debt payments and (2) cx post performance  over time.  We stress the 
preliminary  nature of these results,  particularly  for buyouts undertaken in the last several 
years of our sample period. The ultimate success or failure  of many of these later deals is 
still unresolved. 
Column I of table 10 presents the percentage of each year's buyouts that have 
subsequently  been unable to meet their post-buyout  debt payments  as of February, 1991. 
We determine whether a buyout has missed a debt payment by consulting  10-K filings, the 
WSJ index, and the Nexis database.  Consistent  with our cx ante analysis, defaults 
increase significantly (at the 10% level) over time.  None of the pre-1983 deals, four  of 39 
buyouts in 1983 to 1985, and 14 of 66 buyouts  in 1986 to 1988 have  defaulted.  Buyouts 
completed in 1986 appear to have been  unusually unsuccessful,  with 6 of 15 defaulting on 
post-buyout debt payments.  These measures  clearly understate the number of post-1985 
deals in distress.27 
Column 2 of table 10 presents the percentage  of buyouts that have filed for Chapter 
11 bankruptcy. One-half of the companies that have defaulted on debt payments also have 
filed for Chapter 11.  Because defaults usually precede a Chapter 11 filing, this number may 
increase over time,  particularly  for later transactions. 
26 
Buyout  companies  that default after a post-buyout releveraging  are not considered to 
have defaulted because the original  buyout did not default. 
27 Two additional post-1985 buyouts appear on the verge of  &stress: one is negotiating  with 
creditors after a failed exchange offer,  while  one is attempting  a distressed  exchange offer.  Four 
additional buyouts  have all their public debt currently rated at CCC or  below.  When we exclude 
1988 buyouts  whose distress is less likely to have  been  fully resolved,  the time trends toward 
more defaults in later deals become  more strongly significant. 31 
The increase in defaults may be caused by a combination  of cx ante changes in pricing 
and ex post surprises  in performance.  Columns  3-5 present the annual medians of changes 
in EBITDA, net cash flow, and capital expenditures  to sales in the first post-buyout  year. 
For the entire sample, these ratios change by 9.1%, 36.5%, and -37.6%,  respectively.  There 
are no significant differences in these operating  changes over time.  The default and 
performance patterns are, therefore, consistent  with the cx ante changes in buyout  pricing 
and financial structure playing an important role in the increased number of defaults over 
time. 
We do not intend to suggest  that cx post surprises have not contributed at all to the 
increases in defaults.  The 1986 buyouts  exhibit  particularly  poor performance  cx post that 
undoubtedly  contributes to their high default percentage. Furthermore, short-term interest 
rates reached a minimum  in 1986 and rose steadily  thereafter, Because most buyouts have 
some unhedged  floating  rate debt, cx post rate increases may have increased the incidence of 
default. 
Again, we emphasize  the preliminary  nature of these ex-post  results.  At this time, we 
do not have post-buyout EBITDA results for approximately one-third of the sample 
companies. We recognize  that this leaves open the possibility of a selection  bias.  We have 
post-buyout financial data on eight of the sixteen late-1980s  buyouts that have defaulted.  In 
contrast, we have  such data on 34 of 50 the late-1980s buyouts that have  not defaulted.  This 
may ultimately affect our conclusions  on the trend of cx post performance for this 
sample. 
See, also, Long and Ravenscratt (1991) for more recent evidence  on es-post buyout 
performance. 32 
Summary and discussion 
9.1  Costs of financial  distress 
Although we have discussed  the evolution of  buyout financing techniques in some 
detail, we have not yet fully addressed a central  question:  to what extent did changes in 
buyout  capital structure affect expected costs associated with  financial  distress?  The increase 
in price to cash flow ratios over time, the deterioration of coverages  and the correlation of 
those ratios with ex post distress suggest  that the likelihood of financial  distress  increased 
over time.  Our results,  thus far, have less to say about the costs conditional on such distress. 
It is difficult to quantify the costs of financial distress since that would require 
disentangling  exogenous  shocks to operating performance  from those caused by financial 
structure.  1-lowever,  even without attempting to measure financial  distress Costs directly, we 
can draw some tentative and qualitative  conclusions.  There is a well-developed  body of 
theoretical work that suggests a number of factors that might be expected  to increase costs of 
financial  distress,  and we can examine our data in light of these theories.  In other words, we 
can try to gauge the extent to which the theoretical  'pre-conditions" for costly financial 
distress change over time. 
We already have noted two of the more obvious  pre-conditions.  First, the dramatic 
shift from privately-placed  to widely-held subordinated debt that occurred in 1985 points 
towards higher expected costs of financial  distress.  With widely dispersed creditors, free- 
rider problems are more likely to impede efficiency-enhancing  actions.  For example,  it can 
be in the collective interest of subordinated debtholders to contribute new funds for 
investment,  but any single holder may find it individually rational not to do so. In this 
regard, it is also worth noting the rapid emergence of the secondary market for  senior bank 
buyout loans.  Although  we do not have accurate data for buyouts, conversations  with 
See Bulow and Shaven  (1978) and White (1980 and 1983) for early models that show 
how the inability to renegotiate  with public debtholders leads to inefficiencies. 33 
commercial  bankers suggest that, over time, the ownership of senior bank loans has become 
more fragmented. Gorton and Pennachi  (1991) present evidence that this is true for bank 
loans in general. 
A second change in the pre-conditions  for costly  financial distress is the decline of the 
strip  financing technique common  in earlier buyouts.  When a firm is in distress, conflicts of 
interest between  lenders and equityholders  can lead to the types of distortions discussed by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977).  By partially resolving conflicts  of  interest, 
strip  financing  arguably  reduces these distortions.  Some observers  have singled  out strips as 
an important innovation that made highly leveraged  capital structures more prudent than 
they otherwise appeared. Jensen (1988) writes "because every securityholder  in the highly 
leveraged  firm has the same claim on the firm, there are no conflicts  between senior and 
junior claimants over reorganization  of the claims in default. Thus the firm will not go into 
bankruptcy;  a reorganization  can be accomplished  voluntarily,  quickly, and at a lower cost 
than in bankruptcy  proceedings" If this logic is correct, the decline of  strip financing in the 
late 1980s is surprising. 
In addition to the movement towards  public debt and away from strip financing, other 
changes in  buyout debt structure may also have important implications  for expected costs of 
financial  distress.  One such change is the acceleration of principal repayments on senior 
bank debt.  This acceleration may have especially significant effects in those transactions 
where the junior tier of  debt is widely-held. 
Gertner and Scharfstcin  (1990) point out that the combination of senior bank debt 
and junior public debt can have an adverse  impact on the ability of distressed firms to invest. 
The logic is as follows.  Suppose a firm is in tinancial difficulty and needs an infusion of new 
money to make a positive net present value investment.  On the one hand, hank lenders 
would seem to be the best hope for putting  up the new money, since they do not face  as 
severe a free-rider problem as the widely-dispersed junior lenders.  On the other hand, the 34 
banks' senior status probably reduces their incentive to invest -- the banks may already be 
well-protected,  and may not have much upside to gain from further investment. 
Now consider what happens if the bank's  principal repayments are moved forward in 
time.  This has two negative  effects.  First, the higher debt service burden raises the 
probability  that there will be a distress situation -- it is more likely that the firm will be 
unable to meet its contractual obligations.  Second, the fact that the banks extract value 
more rapidly effectively enhances their senior status relative  to the subordinated dcbt.'0 
This further protects the banks, and may correspondingly  further reduce their incentives to 
contribute new  money.  It seems possible, at least in theory, that the faster repayment 
schedules  might increase expected costs of financial distress. 
in summary,  although our cx ante data  do not allow us to draw any definitive 
conclusions  about expected costs of financial distress, they are, nonetheless,  suggestive  in this 
regard. The buyouts of the late 1980s seem to be characterized  by more of the theoretical 
pre-conditions  for costly  distress.  The increased use of  widely-held debt and the decreased 
use of strip-financing  are relatively unambiguous  examples of this trend.  The acceleration of 
principal  repayments  on the senior bank debt could also have adverse consequences  although 
this effect is more subtle and, perhaps, less robust. 
2  Summary 
We now come back to our original  question:  are there ex ante differences  in the 
pricing and financial  structure of management  buyouts in the later 1980s that might have led 
to disappointing  investor returns relative to those in the earlier deals?  In brief, our analysis 
of 124 larger management  buyouts completed between 1980 and 1989 supports the following 
This is true so long as the firm does not immediately  file for  bankruptcy protection. In 
this case, she repayment schedules would no longer  be relevant, since all debt would effectively 
come due immediately. 35 
conclusions: 
(1)  Prices rose relative to current cash  flows, with no evidence of an accompanying 
decrease in risk or increase in projected future growth.  In part, this movement  reflected 
trends in the stock market as a whole, but there also appears to have been a buyout-specific 
component to the increased  price levels. 
(2)  The more aggressive pricing was coupled with more precarious  financial 
structures.  Debt to total capital ratios rose, leading  to somewhat lower cash flow to interest 
ratios.  More strikingly, bank principal  repayments  accelerated  dramatically,  leading to 
sharply  lower ratios of cash flow to total  cash debt obligations.  In later buyouts, the low 
coverages  necessitated an increased  reliance on asset sales. 
(3)  Private subordinated debt was in large part replaced by widely-held public 
subordinated debt.  The public subordinated debt, in particular, may have been reduced in 
value by the combination  of increased  deferred interest payments and faster senior debt 
principal repayments. Correspondingly,  the use of public debt was also associated  with 
somewhat higher ratios of buyout  prices  to cash flows. 
(4)  The public subordinated debt also made significantly  less use of  strip financing, 
financing that can facilitate debt renegotiations  in financial distress. 
(5)  Finally, other interested parties such as management  and deal promoters took 
more money out of the transactions  up front.  Arguably, this increased  the incentives to 
simply get a deal done and decreased the incentives to ensure  that a buyout was correctly 
priced and structured. 
Many of these trends can be interpreted in different ways.  In one view, the pricing 
and (some of the) structuring adjustments  may have been  a natural competitive  response to 
abnormal positive returns earned in earlier buyouts.  In this view, investors in later 
transactions may have  received cx ante competitive  returns. Alternatively, our results  are 
consistent with some investors  in later LBOs systematically overpaying.  Given the defensive 36 
reaction  by senior lenders over time, it would appear that public subordinated debt holders 
may have  borne the brunt of any such overpayment.  Well-known agency problems at 
institutions  making such investments  -- including insurance  companies  and savings  and loans 
-- could help explain this phenomenon. 37 
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CROP valae.worghted odes over  the  period 560 to 40  days before the bayous announcement.  (2)  and (4) Bernr.aoke-Campbnll  industry 
oarnisaes  betas and standard deviations are  taken from  Beroanke et at. (t990). (3) Standard deviation of fractional  change In operating 
morgto is  calculated  from at toast  stxyears and up to ten years  of  pre-bayout  financial  data.  signifies medians  are nigniScaotly  dillrrorrt 
over time or to comparison periods at the 1%  level:  at the 5% level; and •  at the  10% level. Table 2.  PROJECTED GROWTH 
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All projections are  obtained trout proxy of 1401 slalemeots  dutotibing  buyout  traosaoltons. E13ITDA equals operoting  tvcotuc  heroic 
interent.  laueu, depreciation  nod aruortrz.0000,  CAPX  equals  capital apetiditurm on property, pant.  aod equipment. Year  T-1 is the  last 
lull year before the bovout  aonouocemeot. Year F+i is the oh full year alter the buyaul a0000ecement.  sigoiflea  mcdians  are 
significantly  different over  rote or to ooaspavsoo  pot-toils at the 1% level;  at the 5% lend; acd •  at the  10% level. Table 4 AGGREGATE DEBT AND COVERAGE RATIOS 
Sumnsarv  etatistica of capital  structure  for 124  management  beyotfla cempleted in the  tseeiod  1980-1989  (Dollars  in tailbone), luvouta 
listed 66 year in which  final  transaction  terms set.  The two rot.,  in each cell are the median and number of observations,  ronpcctivoly. 
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Capitat eqaals the  Sam of (1) the  nraeket  vatae paid  foe the hrm'a equity; (2) the hook  vatae at the Brats  outatanding debt; and  (3) the 
teen paid in the transaction; boa (4) any  moan  caah removed from  the  Item Ia finance the buyout.  Pont-baynut debt tnctadea  new bnyout 
debt  and pre-bayout debt that  a not  rehoanced.  Net cash flow  equals EBITDA Ian  capitat mpenditarm  in the ant tall year  before the 
management boyout 000ooncement.  EBITDA  equats operattng tncome before mterent, taxes, depreetation and amortization.  Expected 
interest  payments  are calculated uning the  intermt  calm  and debt  amounts pymected in the proxy oe t4D  ntatementa  dmcnbing the  bavoota, 
Because  meat of the bank debt in these  transactions in priced at a npread over the Loodon Interbank  Offering  Rate (LIBOR)  or  the prime 
rate, we culcolate mpected iotermt  payments  on the  bank debt uutng the eaten in effect at the date uncertainty about  the bid is  emotred, 
Canh  intecmt eqoala ioteeent mu non-ash  interest payments. Requteed debt  repay in two years equals the principal amount at bank  debt 
requtred in the first two pcnt-bayour years.  sigoifim medians net  nignil'tcantty different  aver  time ot io compansen petioda ot the t% 
levet;  at thr 5%  lecet; and  • of the tO% leert. Table 5 
BANK  DEBT 
Annual medtans  of  bank debt variables for 124 management  buyoata  completed  in the  period  1980-1989 (Dollars in millions).  l5uyoutn 
tEed by  year in which final  tranaacuon  terms  set.  The two rows  in each  cell are  the median and number of olmervations,  rrspvctivelv. 
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lime Trend  (-)"  (+)"  (+)"  (+)"  (+)"  (-)"  (+)  (-) 
88-82ov83-85  (+)  (+)  (+)  (-)  (+)  (-)  (+)  1.) 
83-85  us.  86-88  (-)"  (+)"  (+)"  (+)"  (+)"  (-)'  (+)  (-) 
Bank  debt a debt provided to finance Lhe baynat in the  turn of a  senior tern  lean or  revolving  credit  loan.  Bank iotrrcot rare is the 
tttterest rote charged  fur the  bank  debt  an a spread over the prime  rate  or user LIBOR -- the London lnterbaek Offer Rate. Sank fees  are  spfrnnt fees paid to the  lenders of bank  debt.  Fee-adjusted bank interest role calculates the  effective  interest rote on the hank debt  after reductng the bunk debt by the  apfroer  bank  fees and amortizing  the  bank debt.  Annet  sales are present if  they are mentioned as 
espeered ti the  penny nr 14D statement dmaribing  the buyoat Iransacliun.  signifies medium are  significantly  dilfervol  over timo or 
in comparison  periods  at  the 1% level:  at the 5%  level; and  • at the 10% levet. Table 6 
ASSOCIAI1ON  OF ASSET  SALES  TO COVERAGE AND PRICING 
Regressions  of  cash  flow to debt obhgstions  and cash flow to total capital  as a function of expected  asset sales  for  124 management  boyouls 
completed  in the perIod  1980-1989. 
(1) 
Net Cash  How to Cash 
Debt  Obligations 
(2) 
ESITDA to Cash 
Debt  Obltgattons 
(3) 
Net Cash  How  in 
Total Capttat  (%) 
(4) 
EBITDA to 
Total Capital (%) 
Caeff.  SE.  Cool!.  SE.  elf.  S.E.  .oeff.  SE. 
onsiant  0.90'"  0.16  1.26"  0.13  11.6"  2.3  17 4'"  04 
1982 MBOx  -0.46"  0.23  -0.12  0.t8  -0.5  3.0  0.0  1.4 
1983 MBOs  -0.17  0.21  -0.09  0.17  -3.7  2.8  37"  1.4 
1984  MBOs  .0.11  0.19  -0.06  0.16  -2.5  2.6  -2.6  1.2 
1985 MBOo  -0.20  0.19  -0.19  0.16  -2.7  2.7  -4.2'  1 4 
1986 MBOs  -0 34'  021  -0.20  0.t6  -4.3  2.7  2.8'  1.3 
1987  MBOs  -0.51"  8.19  -0.42"  0.15  .57"  26  5 7"  1.2 
1988  MBO5  .038"  0.18  041"  014  -49"  2.0  .5 6"  1.1 
1089  MBOs  -827  024  .030  0.20  -2.7  00  .4.0"  1.8 
Expected 
Ausel  Sales 
-0.26"  0.09  -0.27"  807  24"  1.1  -1.2'  0.7 
N Ohis.  95  '10  120  124 
N-squared  8.28  0.45  1.15  0.28 
Net cash  11am  equals EBITDA  less capital  apenditures in the last lull  year before the nacagement  buvout  aonouocement. EBITDA  equals 
operating  income  before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.  Cash debt  ohttgaiioas  equal the sum of espected  pcat-buyout  cash 
inlerect payments  and bank debt principal  repayment  to the first pcoi-buyout  year. Capital equals  the sum of (1) the  market value paul 
for  the hrtns equity;  (2) the book value  of the  firm's outstanding  debt; and (3) the lees paid  in the transaction;  less (4) any recess cash 
removed Icons the  hem to finance the buyout. Eupecled  Auuet Sales variable equals  11  proxy  or 141) Statement  ackoowledges  plans to 
sell assets after the baynsl; il equals 0 otheensiue. 
Significant  at 1% level.  " 
Sigtaficant at 5% level.  ' 
Signthcani at 10% cart. Table 7 
SUBORDINATED  DEBT 
Soromury ntatiutira  ott nohordiooted  debt for 124 management  bnyouao completed  in the period 1900-1909  (Dotturn iv rvilliono(. 


















86 of Drain 
with PIE  or 
Ditto. Debt 
(6) 













1980  + 
1981 
6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.8  83.3  j  36.6 
1992  8  0.0  12.5  t.2  23.0  3.0  73.0  24.5 
1983  10  0.8  10.0  1.1  18.0  1.1  70.0  27.5 
5984  17  5.9  23.5  5.7  11.8  2.1  47.1  17.3 
1900  52  58.3  58.3  25.9  50.0  7.6  50.0  597 
1986  15  40.0  26.7  17.5  25.7  5.6  33.3  74 
1987  20  50.0  40.0  24.9  00.0  9.7  10.0  4.4 
1900  31  61.3  38.7  22.5  61.3  0.0  29.0  2.0 
1989  5  60.0  40.0  21.5  60.0  10.6  20.0  9.4 














Time trend  (+)"'  (+)  (+)"  (+)"  (+)"  ()  a... 
1980-62  no, 1983-85  (+)  (+)  (+)"  (+)  (+)  (.)  (.) 
1983-85  no. 1906-80  (+)"  (+)  (±)  (+)"  (+)"  ••  1.) 
Junk debl in publicly-innued debt toted below BBB-  by Standard  & Poort or below BaaS  by Moodv'n.  Cram dt,wo  dok in dohr isuvd to 
pro-bavout  rhaeehaldern  an part of the going prrvare payment.  P1K  (pay-ire-kind)  and discount debt are dobt obligariooo  which  do  tot 
require conh inlerent  payrnentu.  Strip Snancing  refers to transactions  itt whioh  rome dehtholdero  hold at trout 151 of poothayout rquoy. 
signiBere  medians  are  significantly  different  over time or in compatiron  periodn  at the  1% tract;  at ho 5% knot;  and  at the  10% 
level. Table 8 
ASSOCIATION  OF JUNK DEBT TO BANK  PARTICIPATION  AND BUYOUT  PRICING 
Regreaaions  of back debt to total debt and cash flow to total capital  as  a  Sanction  of use of jack  debt for 124  management  buyoutn 
completed  in the period 1980-1989, 
(1) 
Bank Debt to 
Total Debt (%) 
(2) 
Net Cash Flies to 
Total Capital (%) 
(3) 
EISITDA  10 
Total Capttal (%) 
ConK  S.D  Coteff.  SE.  CoeD.  SE. 
Constant  40.6"  7.0  tO.4"  2.1  16.8"  1.3 
1982  MBOs  21.9"  9.3  0.7  27  1.3  1.7 
1983 MBOs  25.3"  8.8  -3.4  2.6  -3.6"  1.7 
1984 MOOs  19.3"  0.2  -1.8  2.4  -12  1.5 
1985 MOOs  -1.9  9.0  -1.4  2.6  -3.0  1.7 
1986  MBOs  7.4  0.4  -2.4  2.5  -1.6  1.6 
1987  MBOs  6.3  8.4  -4.7  2.4  .4.8"  1.6 
1988  MOOs  11.4  8.1  -3.6  2.4  -4.4"  1.5 
1989  MOOs  7.5  10.6  15.9  3.1  30  2.8 
Use Jock 
Debt 
-6.2  4.0  -1.6  1.1  -1.6"  0.7 
N Ole.  117  120  124 
R-sqaored  0.25  0.86  0.26 
Book  debt to total debt in the  ratio of the senior debt (term  loan and revolving  credit loan) provided  by  the  senior lender to the total debt 
of the boyout company. Regression  1 escludes transactions  not oning bank debt. Net cash loss equals  f0rfDA lena capital  cspcndttarre 
in Ike last full year before ihe management  bovoat announcement. EBI'IDA equals operoiiog  income belore interest.  Loom, depreciation 
and amortization. Capital  equals the sum of (1) the market noIse paid br the  firm's  equity:  (2) Ike  book  value 01 the firm's  outstanding 
debt; and (3) the  fees paid in the transaction;  lens (4) any memo cash removed from the  hem to Itnunve  the kovout.  Use Junk Debt 
variable  equals one if the boyout  to financed using  publtclyheld  junk debt; it equals 0 otherwtue.  Jade debt is publiclyioaued  debt rated 
below  BBB-  by Standard & Poet's or below Oao3  by Moody's. 
Significant  at 1%  level.  Significant  at 3%  level,  Significant  0118% lend Table 9 
INCENTIVES  AND EQUITY OWNERSHIP 
Attttual  meajiana of  pee-  and peat.buvout  percentage  aatd dollar  management  equity  ownerehip,  and total free to eapitlo  for 124 toanugeatrot 
buyonts  completed in thu pet-sod  1900-1989.  Number of obveraationa  a  below median. 





Equity  (%) 
(3) 
New % /  Old  90 
Mgmt.  Equity 
(4) 
New  I  Old $ 



































































































































iSme trend  ('I-)"  (+)  (-)  (-)  (-1  (±)"' 
1990-82 vs. 1983-85  (+)  (+)"  (-)  (-1  (-)  (+) 
1983-85 vs. 1986-88  (+)  (+)  (.)  (-)"  (+)  (+)" 
Old  management  equity  percentage  ta the  percentage  of pre-buyout  equity  held by the prct-bnyoat management  team. New  management 
equity percentage  is she percentage  uf post-bayout  eqalty held by the  pont-buyout  management  team.  New  % / Old % Mgmt.  Eqoity in  the  rattu of new  managemeat  equity  percentage  to old management  equity  percentage. New S /  Old  S Mgmt. Equity  to the  ratio of the 
dollar  vatun of pont-  to pre-buvout  equity  held by  the  post-buyout  management  team.  Old  equity in valued  at the haul buyaut equity  value. 
Total fern include all fees  repeat-leo in the  prosy or 14D stalemeet deacribing  Ihe buyoat transactian. Capital  equals the  sum 06(1) the 
market eatac paid fur the  ftrm'n eqnity (2) the  book  vatue  of the  hirm'n outntaediag  debt; and (3) the fees paid in the  tranvaction;  (4) 
any recess caah removed  team the  Oem to tinance  the buvout.  signifies medians  are significantly  different over time or in comyanvon 
periads at the 1%  level;  at the  5% level;  and  at the 10% level, Tabte lOt  POST-OUYOUT  PERFORMANCE 
Percetstage of t  muactionu  defaulting on  debt pymenta  and tiling  for Chapter  11 bankruptcy, and medians for pnnt.bayoat performance 
mrauares for 124  management bayoutn completed m the period  1980-1989. Number of ofeeevationu on second hue. 







(3)  I  (4) 
Aotuat  Actuot 
Growth  Growth 
Opernung  Cash blow 
Margina  Margins 

























































































Total  16.8  T 
0.4 









(+)"  (+)"  (+)  (--)  (+) 
1983-85  vs. 
1986-07  (+)"  (+)  (.-)  (--)  f--) 







Firms that default on  debt payments have been unable to meet debt service requirements  incurred under the  terms of the going private 
transaction.  Net cash flow equals EBITDA Iran capital rapeoditures  (CAPX) a the last foil  year before  the muoagemeot buyout 
announcement.  EBITDA  equals operutiog  ocome beiore interest. taxes, depreciation  and amortization.  Year Ti-i is the iih lull  fiscal 
year of peet-buyout operations.  Growth in operating margins T-t  to T+1 is  the percentage  change us the rulio of EBtTDA  to Sues from 
the last fult fincul year of pre-buyout operations to the first full Uncut  year of pont-bavout operations.  Growth  in cash flow uod CAPX 
margins are  the  percentage changes  for the  rHine of net cash flow  to sales  and capital to cairo 1mm year 3-1 10 year itt.  vigoilTues 
mealiana  are  significantly different  veer  time or in comparison periods at the t%  met:  at the 5%  level;  nod • at tOo  10% level. 
(--) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(——) 
(+) 
() 
(—-) 
(-F) 